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ABSTRACT
This paper uses a 2016/2017 sample of 1107 freshly minted university
graduates from a public and a private university in Malaysia. Against a
backdrop of an institutional setting very much diﬀerent from that of
western countries’ and issues of high living costs and graduate
unemployment, we analyse how academic performance aﬀects
graduates’ employment likelihood, salaries, and salary distribution. Using
quantile estimations, we ﬁnd that academic performance is not a key
determinant in whether or not a graduate secures a job upon
graduation, and that having better academic performance would only
be beneﬁcial if the graduates are working in jobs at the lower half of the
salary distribution. We ﬁll the literature gap by analysing how academic
performance aﬀects new graduates in terms of where they are on the
salary distribution continuum; such analyses are neglected in the literature.
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Introduction
Overview
Recent batches of freshly minted university graduates in Malaysia have spared no theatrics in making
known their thoughts on what their starting salaries should be. Lamenting on escalating living costs,
the graduates are asking for seemingly unrealistically high salaries, at least from the employers’ per-
spectives (The Star 2017a). The graduates are reportedly demanding as high as RM6500 (approxi-
mately USD1625) per month (NST 2016a, 2016b). To put into a broader perspective of what
Malaysian fresh graduates are demanding as compared to their peers worldwide, new graduates
in the U.K. are demanding a starting salary of USD1900 (Jerrim 2011), and more than three-quarters
of university graduates in Spain expect a USD2000 starting pay (Alonso-Borrego and Romero-Medina
2016). A key ﬁnding from the Malaysian Ministry of Education Graduate Tracer Study in 2015 reveals
that 54% of the approximately 270,000 graduates with Bachelor’s and Diploma degrees had a starting
salary of less than RM2000 (≈ USD500).
Compounding the issue of new graduates’ starting salary is the issue of graduate unemployment
(The Star 2017b). Before the graduates could even start negotiating their salaries, they would have to
overcome the ﬁrst hurdle, i.e. to secure employment. Based on a report by the Central Bank of Malay-
sia (2016), the youth unemployment rate in Malaysia was 10.7% in 2015, which was more than three
times higher than the national unemployment rate of 3.1%. In Malaysia, youths are deﬁned as those
between the age of 15 and 24; university graduates constitute part of the youths. Even more alarming
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is the fact that, at 23%, university graduates made up almost a quarter of the total number of unem-
ployed youths in 2015. The unemployment rate for youths with tertiary education stood at 15.3%,
compared to a relatively lower 9.8% for youths with non-tertiary education.
We need to understand the institutional setting in Malaysia in order to put into proper context the
graduates’ concerns with salaries and employment likelihood. Unlike university graduates in western
countries where they would usually go for their gap-year experience upon graduation, Malaysian
graduates would be seeking employment. This phenomenon stems from a deeply rooted culture
of parental and peer pressure in securing not only a job, but ideally one that comes along with
good pay and prestige. There is also the ingrained cultural Asian juggernaut of places high value
on excellent academic achievement (Choi and Nieminen 2013; Sue and Okazaki 2009). To nudge
fresh graduates against leaping straight on to the job market bandwagon, the Malaysian Ministry
of Education has recently announced its Gap-Year programme with the ﬁrst cohort of graduates
taking up the programme in September 2017.
Selected literature
From the graduates’ perspective, one way to stand out among their peers in obtaining jobs with good
salary prospects upon graduation is through excellence in academic performance, i.e. in the form of
high Cumulative Grade Point Average (CGPA hereafter) scores. The link between academic perform-
ance and salary expectations of university graduates can be traced back to the theoretical underpin-
nings of the human capital investment theory (Mincer 1958; Schultz 1961, 1962; Becker 1962, 1964)
and the job market screening-signalling theory (Arrow 1973; Spence 1973; Riley 1975; Stiglitz 1975).
The two strands of theories collectively link work productivity to human capital embodied in edu-
cation. For example, Mincer (1958) and Schultz (1962) noted that income would be unequally distrib-
uted according to the level of accumulated human capital, a concept used to capture ability. Becker
(1962) deﬁned human capital investment as the embedding of resources in people; one such
resource is education, which can aﬀect both earning prospects and consumption patterns. The
concept of human capital is built on the theoretical foundation of social capital where one’s
actions are shaped and constrained by the social norms of a society (Coleman 1988).
Academic performance, measured by CGPA, is a way of signalling ability and the quality of embo-
died human capital. CGPA also acts as a screening mechanism, with higher CGPA scores connoting
higher job productivity. People invest in university education with the ultimate aim of securing a job
with high pay. From the sociology point of view, educational attainment is regarded as a tool to
improve on intergenerational social mobility (Goldthorpe 2014; Torche 2011). In fact, achieving
good labour market outcomes and quality education are two of the important aspirations of the
2016–2020 Eleventh Malaysian Plan in producing more holistic graduates with better job prospects
(Ministry of Education Malaysia 2015).
Recent empirical literature has focused on the link between academic performance/credentials
with graduate employability/employment (Pinto and Ramalheira 2017; Figueiredo et al. 2017;
Nunley et al. 2016; Pirog 2016). Using a resume-sifting experimental approach, Pinto and Ramalheira
(2017) examined the eﬀects of academic performance as one of the two key determinants on the
perceived employability of Portuguese business graduates. Figueiredo et al. (2017) is another
recent Portuguese study using macro level data for the 2000–2010 period; they analysed the gap
between academic competency and post-employment job competency. In another European
study on the labour market outcomes of Polish graduates, Pirog (2016) looked at how diﬀerent com-
ponents of educational capital aﬀect the graduates’ employment chances; the graduates’ ﬁnal cumu-
lative grade is a component of educational capital, along with the level of education, discipline of
study, and internship components. In yet another similar resume-sifting experimental study, this
time in the United States, Nunley et al. (2016) analysed the impact of internship experience and
the type of college majors on interview call-back (as a proxy to employment chances), for graduates
with diﬀerent levels of academic performance. Past Malaysian studies have also suggested academic
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performance as one of the key criteria of graduate employability and employment (Cheong et al.
2018; Jayasingam, Fujiwara, and Thurasamy 2018; Hashim 2012; Lim 2010; Lim, Rich, and Harris
2008). Using an online questionnaire survey on Malaysian university students and interviews with
medium-sized and large ﬁrms, Cheong et al. (2018) examined the attributes perceived as most impor-
tant for employability from both the students’ and employers’ perspectives. Jayasingam, Fujiwara,
and Thurasamy (2018) conducted a ﬁeld experiment on human resource and recruitment executives
to determine the impact of graduates’ choosiness and general skill competency on employability.
Both of Lim’s (Lim, Rich, and Harris’s 2008; Lim 2010) studies analysed the employability and employ-
ment outcomes of graduates from a sole Malaysian university, while Hashim’s (2012) work examined
the important of academic performance from the employers’ point of view. Our study complements
these aforementioned Malaysian studies by using a sample comprising recent graduates from two
Malaysian universities, and by analysing the importance of academic performance on labour
market outcomes from the graduates’ perspective.
The literature has also examined the relationship between academic performance and the salaries
of fresh university graduates (Feng and Graetz 2017; Naylor, Smith, and Telhaj 2016; Freier, Schu-
mann, and Siedler 2015). Using a regression discontinuity design on a sample of UK university gradu-
ates, Feng and Graetz (2017) estimated the causal eﬀect of academic degree class on the graduates’
earnings. In another causal estimation study, Freier, Schumann, and Siedler (2015) examined the
earnings of German top graduates in law, using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences setup. Naylor, Smith,
and Telhaj (2016) also analysed the relationship between academic degree classes and UK university
graduates’ earnings, though not within a causal estimation framework as the previous two studies.
Malaysian studies looking at academic performance and graduates’ salaries are somewhat lacking,
perhaps with the notable exception of a related study which investigates the eﬀects of the levels
of education on the earnings of working adults (Arshad and Ghani 2015). Their study however
emphasised on working adults, not fresh university graduates per se.
Research signiﬁcance and objectives
The burgeoning literature has given separate treatment to the issues of fresh graduates’ salary levels
and employment likelihood. More importantly, these studies have been undertaken in an insti-
tutional setting very much diﬀerent from that of Malaysia’s. Our paper contributes to the literature
pool by examining the issues of graduate employment and salaries in the Malaysian context using
a recent unique dataset collected in the 2016/2017 period. We also ﬁll the literature gap by providing
an empirical analysis of how academic performance aﬀects new graduates in terms of where they are
on the salary distribution continuum. Analyses on salary distribution of new graduates appear to have
been neglected in the literature. Our paper thus has three speciﬁc objectives. First, we examine how
academic performance aﬀects the graduates’ employment likelihood. Second, we investigate how
academic performance aﬀects their salaries. Third, we analyse the eﬀects of academic performance
on diﬀerent segments of salary distribution.
Method
Sample
The target population for this study is the recent 2016/2017 batch of Malaysian public and private
university graduates. This paper uses a sample of 1107 respondents selected from a public university
(Universiti Utara Malaysia, UUM), and a private university (Sunway University). Our sample is distin-
guished from those of past Malaysian studies (Lim 2010; Lim, Rich, and Harris 2008) in terms of (i)
the inclusion of graduates from both the public and private universities, and (ii) the homogeneity
of the programme types oﬀered by these public and private universities. There were 710 respondents
from UUM, and 397 from Sunway University. Only Malaysian graduates made up the ﬁnal usable
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sample. Non-Malaysian graduates are required to return to their countries as they only possess
student visas, and not work permits. The respondents were surveyed during their respective gradu-
ation robe collection period. The graduates were assigned designated days and time slots for robe
collection. The designated robe collection slots were based on programme types. Graduates from
UUM and Sunway University are selected because they are comparable in terms of programme
types. The programmes oﬀered by these two universities are typically in business, economics,
accounting, management, and information technology among others.
Model speciﬁcation and estimation
This paper speciﬁes three diﬀerent models to answer the three research objectives: binary logit
model, ordinary least-square (OLS) model, and quantile model. To fulﬁl the ﬁrst objective of this
paper, we use a binary logit model to estimate the marginal eﬀects of CGPA on the graduates’ prob-
abilities of gaining employment six months upon graduation. The hypothesis here is that graduates
with higher CGPA have higher probabilities of being employed (Hypothesis 1). In the binary logit
model, the graduates’ actual employment outcome (y) is regressed on a vector of explanatory vari-
ables (X) such that y = Xb+ 1, where y and 1 are n× 1 vectors, b is a k × 1 vector, and 1 is a vector of
error terms. X is an n× k matrix with k explanatory variables for n observations. The dependent
variable y has a binary outcome with y = 1 as being employed and 0 otherwise. y∗ is a latent con-
tinuous random variable related to its observable counterpart y with y = 1 (y∗ . 0). The latent vari-
able y∗ represents the graduates’ underlying tendencies to be employed. Such tendencies are
associated with a vector of observable characteristics (X). Once the latent variable crosses the
y∗ . 0 threshold, we observe y = 1 (being employed). We deﬁne ‘being employed’ as having one
of these three outcomes – being employed in a full-time job, being employed in a part-time job,
or being self-employed. The numbers of self-employed graduates are negligible. We believe that it
is partly due to the institutional setting in Malaysia in which graduates typically compete for
coveted vacancies in either the public or private sector, unlike university graduates in western
countries who are more likely to embrace the entrepreneurial attitude to be self-employed
(Oinonen 2018). The explanatory variable of interest of the binary logit model is the CGPA (either
scores or classes). This is also the explanatory variable of interest for the other two following
models. In fact, the focus of this paper is to estimate the marginal eﬀects of CGPA on the dependent
variables for all three models.
To fulﬁl the second objective of this paper, we use an OLS model, in which the dependent variable
(y) is the amount of salary earned for graduates who are employed. The OLS model of y = Xb+ 1
estimates the conditional mean function of the dependent variable, i.e. E[y|X] = Xb. This model esti-
mates the marginal eﬀects of CGPA (either scores or classes) on the employed graduates’ salaries. We
hypothesised that higher CGPA would have positive marginal eﬀects on salaries (Hypothesis 2).
The OLS estimation, however, only provides a partial view and is unable to reveal if there are any
relationships between CGPA and salaries at diﬀerent points (segments or quantiles) in the conditional
distribution of y. In order to do this, and to fulﬁl the third objective of this paper, we use a quantile
model. A quantile model examines the impact of X on diﬀerent segments or quantiles of the y vari-
able. Quantile estimations basically model distributions, such as the salary distribution in this study.
The marginal eﬀects obtained from conditional mean estimations such as the OLS model assume the
constant impact of a covariate across diﬀerent segments of the dependent variable, which might not
necessarily be the case. The marginal eﬀects of a covariate on the dependent variable may be
diﬀerent, depending on diﬀerent segments or quantiles of the dependent variable. In the context
of this study, we hypothesise that the marginal eﬀects of CGPA (either scores or classes) on the gradu-
ates’ salaries are diﬀerent, depending on which quantile of the salary distribution we are referring to
(Hypothesis 3).
The quantile estimation is ﬁrst developed by Koenker and Bassett in their 1978 seminal paper.
Conditional on a matrix of covariates X , the quantile model is set up as follows:
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Quantt(y|X) = a(t)+ Xb(t), where Quantt(y|X) denotes the tth quantile of the dependent variable
vector y, t denotes the tth conditional quantile of the continuous monthly salary (y) distribution,
and t [ (0, 1). We are modelling salary quantiles (i.e. the dependent variable) on X , with CGPA as
the explanatory variable of interest. The quantiles are assumed to be linear in parameters; as in
OLS estimations, X can include nonlinear functions of the explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2010,
450). Conventional OLS models answer questions such as ‘Do CGPA scores aﬀect salary?’. Quantile
models, on the other hand, address questions like ‘Do CGPA scores aﬀect salary diﬀerently for
those employed in jobs with salaries at the upper end of the salary distribution than for those
employed in jobs with lower-end salaries?’. Using quantile models, the eﬀects of CGPA on a particular
salary quantile can be compared to those on other salary quantiles. Heterogeneity across diﬀerent
salary quantiles can therefore be studied; in fact, the quantile model is a tool to analyse such hetero-
geneities speciﬁcally (Koenker and Hallock 2001).
Findings and discussions
Discussion of ﬁndings I: summary statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics in two panels. Figures are reported as means for continuous
variables, and proportions for categorical variables. The number of observations, N, is only reported
for categorical variables. The panel on the left shows the sample statistics on employment status. The
panel on the right reports statistics by quantiles (Q1 to Q4) of the monthly salary. Slightly less than
half of the 1107 respondents in this study are gainfully employed at the time of the survey (i.e. being
employed full/part-time or self-employed). There are no apparent diﬀerences in the CGPA scores
between those employed (3.32) and unemployed (3.33). From the p-value column, there are no stat-
istically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the CGPA scores or the three CGPA classes between the employed
and unemployed. The p-value of 0.443, for example, indicates that there are no statistical diﬀerences
between the proportions of ﬁrst-class holders who are employed (0.17) and their unemployed (0.19)
counterparts. Summary statistics for the remaining variables are similarly interpreted. The p-value
reports the t-test (comparing the two employment categories) and F-test (comparing the four cat-
egories of salary quantiles) statistical signiﬁcance results.
Among the employed, their average monthly salary is RM2054 (≈ USD515). The panel on the right
shows four salary quantiles; the ‘All’ column combines all the quantiles. Salaries of those employed
are ﬁrst sorted in an ascending order and then grouped into the respective quantiles, with those
in the highest quantile earning an average salary of RM3254 (≈ USD815). Signiﬁcant p-values
suggest diﬀerences across the salary quantiles. With p-values less than 1%, the proportions of
those with ﬁrst and second upper classes of CGPA are likely to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the
salary quantiles. The proportions of ﬁrst-class holders increase discernibly across the salary quantiles,
from 0.09 in the lowest quantile to 0.26 in the highest; 26% of the ﬁrst-class holders have jobs in the
highest salary quantile, compared to 9% with jobs in the lowest salary quantile. The summary stat-
istics reveal the proportions of ﬁrst-class holders with jobs in diﬀerent salary quantiles.
Apart from the explanatory variable of interest, Table 1 also provides summary statistics for two
sets of control variables: academic-related variables and demographic variables. In addition to
these two sets of controls, there are four other sets of controls used in diﬀerent models (logit and
OLS) and model speciﬁcations (M1 to M6). A later section elaborates on the controls used.
Discussion of ﬁndings II: eﬀects of CGPA on the probability of being employed
Table 2 presents the marginal eﬀects of CGPA on the probability of being employed. We use ﬁve logit
model speciﬁcations (columns M1 to M5). The M1 speciﬁcation only looks at the marginal eﬀect of the
variable of interest (i.e. CGPA scores) on the dependent variable (i.e. probability of being employed).
From Panel A, CGPA scores as the sole explanatory variable in M1 do not exhibit any signiﬁcant
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Table 1. Summary statistics.
Employment status Salary
N Employed Unemployed p-value N All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 p-value
Dependent variable
Monthly salary (RM) – 2054 – – – 2054 1091 1955 2351 3254 0.000
No. of observations, N 1107 544 563 0.352 544 – 181 138 91 134 –
Explanatory variable of interest
CGPA scoresa – 3.32 3.33 0.834 – 3.32 3.26 3.30 3.37 3.37 0.018
First Class 196 0.17 0.19 0.443 196 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.000
Second Upper 753 0.68 0.67 0.990 753 0.67 0.75 0.69 0.58 0.61 0.007
Second Lower 151 0.14 0.12 0.437 151 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.783
Academic-related variables
Private university graduates 396 0.35 0.33 0.678 396 0.35 0.16 0.36 0.34 0.59 0.000
Joined societies 405 0.42 0.34 0.007 405 0.42 0.46 0.40 0.37 0.44 0.494
Oﬀered job before graduating 322 0.34 0.28 0.083 322 0.33 0.25 0.35 0.42 0.38 0.017
Internship salary (RM) – 632 641 0.692 – 632 533 586 673 770 0.000
Socio-demographic variables
Household size – 5.6 5.8 0.316 – 5.6 6.3 5.6 5.2 5.1 0.000
Mother postsecondary educ 242 0.20 0.23 0.332 242 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.25 0.461
Father postsecondary educ 281 0.22 0.27 0.097 281 0.22 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.255
Parents’ income (RM) – 3483 4038 0.118 – 3463 3467 2649 2741 4786 0.008
Age – 24.5 24.2 0.026 – 24.5 24.8 24.4 24.4 24.3 0.219
Female 748 0.69 0.66 0.481 748 0.68 0.72 0.67 0.72 0.63 0.260
Malay ethnic group 429 0.38 0.41 0.446 429 0.38 0.67 0.37 0.18 0.12 0.000
Note: Figures are reported as means for continuous variables, and proportions for categorical variables.
a The maximum CGPA score is 4.00.
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statistical eﬀect on the probability of being employed, Prob(Employed). M2 includes academic-related
and types of programme controls (Set A). M3 expands the control list to include pre-university aca-
demic achievements (Set B). In M4, demographic controls are included. To capture nonlinearities,
squared and interaction terms are included as additional controls in M5 (Set C). None of the ﬁve spe-
ciﬁcations capture any eﬀects of CGPA scores on Prob(Employed).
To check if CGPA classes are able to capture any signiﬁcant marginal eﬀects, we break down the
CGPA scores, categorise them by classes, and re-estimate the ﬁve speciﬁcations using each of the
three categorical variables, one by one (Panel B). Only the second-upper class dummy exhibits
some statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on Prob(Employed). Graduates with a second-upper class have
higher probabilities of being employed, as suggested by the statistically signiﬁcant marginal
eﬀects in the M4 and M5 speciﬁcations of Table 2; the probability of being employed for these gradu-
ates is between 7 and 8 percentage points higher than those who are not second-upper class holders,
ceteris paribus. The marginal eﬀects, however, are only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Being ﬁrst-class or
second-lower class holders do not seem to have any signiﬁcant eﬀects on Prob(Employed). Our
ﬁndings here suggest no compelling evidence of academic performance being the sole determinant
of graduate employment.
Our ﬁndings resonate with those from past studies. Pinto and Ramalheira (2017) found perceived
employability to be higher for graduates who were both academically excellent and all-rounders in
extracurricular activities. Perceived employability was also attributed to soft skills rather than to
Table 2. Logit estimations of the eﬀects of CGPA on probability of being employed.
Dependent variable: Prob. (Employed) M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Panel A
CGPA scores −0.00892 0.0229 0.0318 0.0454 −0.177
(0.0427) (0.0510) (0.0567) (0.0646) (0.0964)
Academic-related variables
Private university graduates 0.0582 0.0728 0.0977 −1.277***
(0.0434) (0.0538) (0.0817) (0.456)
Joined societies 0.0731** 0.0596 0.0684* 0.0683*
(0.0344) (0.0366) (0.0403) (0.0399)
Oﬀered job before graduating 0.0689* 0.0876** 0.103** 0.103**
(0.0358) (0.0379) (0.0420) (0.0419)
Internship salary −0.00276 0.0154 −0.0184 −0.00914
(0.0363) (0.0390) (0.0436) (0.0440)
Socio-demographic variables
Household size −0.0132 −0.0947*
(0.0125) (0.0562)
Mother postsecondary educ −0.0461 −0.0581
(0.0627) (0.0622)
Father postsecondary educ −0.0883 −0.0886
(0.0598) (0.0595)
Parents’ income 0.0164 0.0289
(0.0302) (0.0300)
Age 0.0352** −0.134
(0.0171) (0.278)
Female −0.00115 0.0604
(0.0429) (0.0557)
Malay ethnic group 0.0231 0.0520
(0.0600) (0.0867)
Panel B
First Class −0.0262 −0.0118 −0.0109 −0.0276 −0.0761
(0.0391) (0.0436) (0.0496) (0.0566) (0.0577)
Second Upper 0.00672 0.0287 0.0447 0.0801* 0.0757*
(0.0304) (0.0366) (0.0396) (0.0430) (0.0435)
Second Lower 0.0345 −0.00418 −0.00146 −0.0210 0.102
(0.0443) (0.0511) (0.0533) (0.0597) (0.0767)
Controls (Set A, B, C) ✓A ✓A, B ✓A, B ✓A, B, C
N 1083 868 766 626 626
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcant at *10%, **5%, and ***1% level.
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disciplinary knowledge competency (Cheong et al. 2018; Jayasingam, Fujiwara, and Thurasamy 2018).
In fact, a review by Hogan, Chamorro-Premuzic, and Kaiser (2013) found that from the employers’ per-
spective, academic performance played only a ‘ﬁrst-pass ﬁlter’ minor role, as compared to other more
important determinants of employability such as interpersonal skills, good attitude, work ethics, and
job competency. From the graduates’ perception, it was indeed found that university degrees do not
equip them adequately with the skills required in the labour market (Figueiredo et al. 2017). Employ-
ment chances, in the form of interview call-backs, were found to be statistically signiﬁcant for gradu-
ates with high academic performance only if they had had internship experience; high academic
performance on its own did not exhibit any statistical signiﬁcance on such employment chances
(Nunley et al. 2016). Pirog (2016) also came to similar conclusions, i.e. the graduates’ ﬁnal grades
did not have any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on employment outcomes. Results from these past
studies indeed lend support to our ﬁndings here in this section.
Discussion of ﬁndings III: eﬀects of CGPA on salary and related empirical issues
There are two panels in Table 3. The OLS estimation results in Panel A show statistically signiﬁcant
marginal eﬀects of CGPA scores on the salaries earned, across all six model speciﬁcations. The depen-
dent variable is the natural logarithm of the graduates’ monthly salary. A 1.0-unit increase in CGPA
scores results in between 16.6% and 32.7% increase in salary, depending on model speciﬁcation.
Table 3. OLS estimations of the eﬀects of CGPA on salaries
Dependent variable: ln(Salary) M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Panel A
CGPA scores 0.166*** 0.260*** 0.219*** 0.297*** 0.244*** 0.327**
(0.0615) (0.0703) (0.0827) (0.0934) (0.0919) (0.142)
Academic-related variables
Private university graduates 0.270*** 0.262*** 0.252** 0.237* 0.494
(0.0584) (0.0757) (0.114) (0.121) (0.604)
Joined societies −0.0539 −0.0328 −0.0419 −0.0599 −0.0677
(0.0455) (0.0475) (0.0539) (0.0534) (0.0526)
Oﬀered job before graduating 0.0823* 0.112** 0.0924 0.0567 0.0618
(0.0477) (0.0498) (0.0617) (0.0613) (0.0599)
Internship salary 0.159*** 0.211*** 0.235*** 0.192*** 0.158***
(0.0520) (0.0482) (0.0549) (0.0569) (0.0551)
Socio-demographic variables
Household size −0.0275* −0.0254* −0.0549
(0.0157) (0.0149) (0.0575)
Mother postsecondary educ 0.0645 0.0904 0.0655
(0.121) (0.115) (0.114)
Father postsecondary educ 0.00274 −0.0287 −0.0193
(0.124) (0.118) (0.117)
Parents’ income 0.00866 −0.000874 0.00986
(0.0432) (0.0418) (0.0420)
Age 0.0560*** 0.0569*** −0.216**
(0.0196) (0.0204) (0.0922)
Female −0.0457 −0.0435 −0.141*
(0.0597) (0.0577) (0.0743)
Malay ethnic group −0.158* −0.0815 −0.172
(0.0875) (0.0858) (0.148)
Panel B
First Class 0.208*** 0.189*** 0.171*** 0.161** 0.113* 0.109
(0.0469) (0.0517) (0.0602) (0.0731) (0.0677) (0.0760)
Second Upper −0.188*** −0.0548 −0.0428 −0.0214 −0.00776 −0.0447
(0.0438) (0.0485) (0.0540) (0.0612) (0.0564) (0.0633)
Second Lower −0.0319 −0.128* −0.104 −0.141 −0.133 −0.0736
(0.0634) (0.0676) (0.0748) (0.0860) (0.0840) (0.103)
Controls (Set A, B, C, D) ✓A ✓A, B ✓A, B ✓A, B, D ✓ A, B, C, D
N 544 437 387 302 302 302
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcant at *10%, **5%, and ***1% level.
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In terms of controls, the ﬁrst four speciﬁcations are the same as those explained in the previous logit
estimation section. M5 includes work-related controls (Set D), and M6 expands the control list further
to include squared and interaction terms (Set C). M5 is used as the main speciﬁcation here since its
Bayesian Information Criterion gives the lowest readings (unreported here) across the six speciﬁca-
tions, regardless of whether CGPA scores or CGPA classes are used. The M5 speciﬁcation shows
that a 1.0-unit increase in CGPA scores is associated with a nontrivial 24.4% increase in salary,
ceteris paribus.
Panel B shows the results when CGPA scores are being replaced with CGPA class dummies. For
example, if we use the First Class dummy in M5, its coeﬃcient suggests that ﬁrst-class holders
would have a salary of about 11.3% higher than those who are not ﬁrst-class holders, ceteris
paribus. If we use the Second Upper dummy, we get a statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient from
M5; and similarly, if the Second Lower dummy is used. Our results here are similar to those found
by Feng and Graetz (2017), in which they concluded that a First Class would increase the probability
of working in a high-wage industry, as compared to obtaining a Second Upper class. As for Naylor,
Smith, and Telhaj (2016), they found both the First Class and the Second Upper class to be signiﬁ-
cantly associated with higher salaries. Re-categorising CGPA scores into CGPA classes has helped
detect the CGPA class that is actually driving the results. Panel A shows that CGPA scores are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant throughout all six speciﬁcations. Panel B however, shows that not all CGPA classes
exhibit signiﬁcant marginal eﬀects on the salaries earned. Having a Second Upper or a Second
Lower class has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on the salaries earned in M5.
On controls
The use of a cross-sectional dataset in this study precludes the possibility of testing for plausible
unobserved individual-speciﬁc heterogeneity as in using a panel dataset. If unaccounted for, such
unobserved heterogeneity could lead to omitted variable bias. We circumvent this data limitation
by including as many relevant controls as practically feasible, depending on the data we have and
ensuring we have suﬃcient degrees of freedom for meaningful estimations. We have six sets of con-
trols altogether: academic-related variables, socio-demographic variables, types of university pro-
grammes (Set A), pre-university academic achievements (Set B), squared/interaction terms (Set C),
and work-related variables (Set D). Results for the Set A to Set D controls are not displayed in the
result tables to minimise unnecessary clutter in reporting.
As reported in Table 1, academic-related controls include variables such as whether the respon-
dent graduated from a private university (to control for the type of university, i.e. public and
private), whether the graduate participated in university societies/clubs/association (to control for
all-rounder graduates, and not just the academically inclined), whether the graduate was already
oﬀered a job prior to graduating (to control for the graduate employability), and the graduate’s
internship salary (to control for hints of initial work productivity; also note that, internship has
been made a compulsory requirement for graduation in both the Malaysian public and private uni-
versities). Socio-demographic controls include variables to control for a graduate’s socioeconomic
status such as household size, parents’ education level, and household income. Age, gender, and
ethnic groups are also included as individual demographic controls.
The remaining sets of controls, Set A to Set D, are used in diﬀerent models and model speciﬁca-
tions for model robustness checks, and for selecting the most inclusive model speciﬁcation as the
main speciﬁcation. Set A controls involve the types of university programmes, i.e. business, infor-
mation technology, accounting, economics, entrepreneurship, ﬁnance, and management-related
programmes such as hospitality, tourism, human resource, operation, logistics, and risk management
among others. To reiterate, graduates from UUM and Sunway were selected due to the homogeneity
in the types of programmes oﬀered by these two public and private universities. Set B is a list of con-
trols on pre-university academic achievements, i.e. English language proﬁciency level of the
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Malaysian University English Test (MUET), high-school (Form 5) English and the Malaysian national
language proﬁciency levels, and university entrance exam CGPA scores.
To capture nonlinearities, Set C controls are included. In this set, continuous variables are squared,
e.g. household size and age, whereas categorical variables are interacted with each other, e.g. gender
with ethnic groups, and CGPA class with types of university. The sets of controls used for the logit
(Table 2) and OLS (Table 3) estimations diﬀer slightly. Since the dependent variable used in the
logit estimations is whether or not a recent graduate has gained employment, work-related controls
(Set D) are excluded. Work-related controls are included in the OLS estimations on the salaries of
employed graduates. The work-related controls in this study include (i) geographical state/region
where the company is located, (ii) the type of company, i.e. public-listed, small-and-medium enter-
prises, or foreign-owned, and (iii) the type of business sector, i.e. manufacturing, service, or construc-
tion. With the exception of work-related controls, both the logit and OLS estimations use the same
sets of controls.
On endogeneity
There might be concerns over the issue of the variable of interest (CGPA scores and classes) being
endogenous. The CGPA might be correlated with the error term, i.e. CGPA might be correlated
with, for instance, unobserved innate ability which is being subsumed in the error term. We used
a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation on the M5 speciﬁcation of Table 3 to test the endogeneity
of CGPA (scores and classes). We instrumented CGPA with a dummy of whether or not the student
loans received were convertible to scholarships. Loan convertibility status satisﬁes the ﬁrst condition
of a good instrument, Cov(Z, u) = 0, i.e. it is unrelated to howmuch salary a person is earning. This ﬁrst
condition is the exclusion restriction because the instrument, Z, is excluded from the model of inter-
est (i.e. the model in which salary is regressed on CGPA). In the post-estimation endogeneity test, it
returned a p-value of more than 0.10, indicating insuﬃcient statistical proof to reject the null hypoth-
esis of CGPA being exogenous. The ﬁrst condition, Cov(Z, u) = 0, is being met. We then proceeded to
check the second condition of a good instrument, Cov(Z, Xk) ⍰ 0, using a ﬁrst-stage regression, as
suggested by Wooldridge (2010, 92). Results from this ﬁrst-stage regression revealed that there
was a statistically signiﬁcant association between CGPA (Xk) and the instrument (Z ), with a p-value
less than 0.001. This therefore satisﬁes the Cov(Z, Xk) ⍰ 0 condition. These two conditions are the
key identifying assumptions for the CGPA coeﬃcient being exogenous. Since there is no statistical
evidence of CGPA being endogenous, concerns over the endogeneity issue are perhaps
unwarranted.
On sample-selection bias
In estimating the marginal eﬀects of CGPA on the probability of being employed, the entire sample of
N = 1107 observations is used in the logit estimations. The observed dependent variable, Y, would
either be 1 (employed) or 0 (otherwise). All the 1107 respondents in the sample would have an
observed Y outcome. In using OLS estimations to capture the marginal eﬀects of CGPA on the
salary earned however, the issue of self-selection or sample-selection bias might arise. We use self
and sample selection interchangeably. In a sample-selection bias problem, incidental truncation is
where certain variables are observed only if other variables take on particular values (Wooldridge
2010, 777). The dependent variable in the OLS estimations, i.e. the monthly salary, is only observed
for graduates who are employed.
Self-selection bias arises if the graduates self-select themselves into employment, and therefore
earn a salary; how much salaries they earn might be related to the very characteristics that have
the graduates employed in the ﬁrst place. Therefore, there might be potential sample-selection
bias if we only use data on the subsample of those employed to estimate the salary. To ensure
that the OLS estimation results we obtained in Table 3 were not plagued by sample-selection bias,
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we used the Heckman selection model on the M5 speciﬁcation to check for the presence of sample-
selection bias. The results showed no evidence of such bias; there was no statistical evidence to reject
the null hypothesis of independent equations (i.e. the ‘Employed’ selection equation and the ‘Salary’
outcome equation) or equivalently, H0: ρ = 0 (i.e. the rho, ρ, is the correlation coeﬃcient of the error
terms from the selection and the outcome equations). Since the Heckman selection model results
suggested no presence of sample selection bias, the marginal eﬀects in Table 3 can therefore be
deemed unbiased.
Discussion of ﬁndings IV: eﬀects of CGPA on diﬀerent segments of salary distribution
In the earlier Table 3, we examined the marginal eﬀects of CGPA on salary. The OLS estimates in Table
3 however only tell a partial story. The eﬀects of CGPA may not necessarily be constant across
diﬀerent segments or quantiles of the graduates’ salary distribution. Before we discuss how CGPA
might have diﬀerent eﬀects across segments of the salary distribution, let us ﬁrst examine the
salary’s probability density function (PDF). Figure 1 suggests that the First Class cohort earns more,
with a mean salary of RM2296 (≈ USD575). The Second Upper and Second Lower cohorts earn a
mean salary of RM1918 (≈ USD480) and RM1957 (≈ USD490) each. The PDF for the First Class
cohort is at the rightward-most position, compared to the other two PDFs. A statistical test for diﬀer-
ences in the mean salary by GCPA classes quickly conﬁrmed that the mean salary indeed diﬀers
between the three classes, i.e. the test returned an F-statistic of 8.96 with a p-value of 0.0001. The
results from Figure 1 are possible tell-tale signs that the eﬀects of CGPA on salary are not as straight-
forward as what they might have seemed in Table 3. There might be considerable heterogeneity in
the eﬀects of CGPA across diﬀerent segments of the salary distribution, which typical OLS estimation
would be unable to capture.
Looking across diﬀerent segments of the salary distribution, quantile model estimations could
unveil underlying patterns not readily detectable from OLS estimations. The quantile model speciﬁ-
cation in Table 4 follows the M5model speciﬁcation of Table 3. For ease of comparison, OLS estimates
from M5 of Table 3 are reproduced here in Table 4. To reiterate, an OLS model estimates the
Figure 1. Probability density function of salary by CGPA classes.
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conditional mean, while a quantile model analogously estimates the conditional quantiles. As shown
in Table 4, the marginal eﬀects of CGPA (scores or classes) on salary are very diﬀerent when we look
across the salary distribution quantiles. Reporting the OLS estimate of 0.244 would have overesti-
mated the CGPA scores coeﬃcient on salary for graduates with jobs at the uppermost end of the
salary distribution. Focusing just on the coeﬃcient magnitudes and disregarding statistical signiﬁ-
cance for a moment, higher CGPA scores have much smaller marginal eﬀects on the salary for
those with jobs at the topmost-end of the salary distribution (i.e. the top quantile, Q90). Quantile
model estimations analyse the eﬀect of CGPA at diﬀerent points of the salary distribution, thus
describing the entire conditional salary distribution in a parsimonious way.
The marginal eﬀect of CGPA scores at the highest 0.9 quantile of salary distribution is statistically
insigniﬁcant though. Compared to their counterparts with jobs at lower salary quantiles, an increase
in CGPA scores has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the salary for graduates with jobs at the
highest salary quantile. On the contrary, CGPA scores have a nontrivial statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect at the lower ends of the salary distribution. For example, a 1.0-unit increase in CGPA scores
is associated with about 39% increase in salary for those with jobs at the two lowest salary quantiles
(Q10 and Q25). At the upper end of the salary distribution, i.e. at the 0.75 quantile, a 1.0-unit increase
in CGPA scores is associated with only about 15% increase in salary. CGPA scores, therefore, have
larger eﬀects on the salary for those with jobs at lower ends of the salary distribution. Had we just
relied on OLS estimations of the conditional mean, we would be unable to capture the eﬀects of
the CGPA scores on diﬀerent quantiles of the salary distribution.
CGPA scores are then substituted with a CGPA class dummy each. First-class degree holders with
jobs at the lower quantile (Q25) have a salary of 18.3% higher than those without ﬁrst-class degrees.
The eﬀect of having a ﬁrst-class degree decreases as we move up the quantile (from Q25 to Q50).
First-class degree holders with jobs at the 0.5 quantile have a salary of only 9.8% higher than
those without ﬁrst-class degrees. Substituting CGPA scores with a second-upper or a second-lower
class dummy, these dummies display signiﬁcant marginal eﬀects (but only at the 10% signiﬁcance
level) at the top salary quantile (Q90).
What are the quantile estimates telling us? The marginal eﬀects of the CGPA scores suggest having
higher CGPA scores would be most beneﬁcial if the graduates are working in jobs at the lower half of
the salary distribution (Q50 or below). These jobs would likely be entry-level jobs for new university
graduates. It makes sense that the magnitude of the CGPA eﬀects decreases as we move up the salary
distribution. This is because the upper quantiles of the salary distribution are often associated with
jobs that require not only good academic achievement, but also work experience as well. This
may explain why CGPA scores and the ﬁrst-class dummy do not exhibit any statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects at the highest quantile (Q90).
In using quantile regression models, a caveat applies. Note that the quantile estimates show the
eﬀects on distributions, and not on individuals (Angrist and Pischke 2009). For example, if we ﬁnd that
CGPA scores increase the salary at the lower quantiles of the salary distribution, this does not imply
Table 4. Quantile estimations of the eﬀects of CGPA on salary quantiles.
DV: log(salary) OLS Quantiles
M5 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
CGPA scores 0.244*** 0.395** 0.398*** 0.129 0.149** 0.0825
(0.0919) (0.191) (0.107) (0.0836) (0.0702) (0.0914)
First Class 0.113* 0.231 0.183** 0.0980* 0.0619 0.00721
(0.0677) (0.146) (0.0771) (0.0526) (0.0472) (0.0634)
Second Upper −0.00776 −0.118 −0.0832 −0.0207 0.0244 0.0860*
(0.0564) (0.131) (0.0819) (0.0538) (0.0508) (0.0515)
Second Lower −0.133 −0.239 −0.206 −0.102 −0.0757 −0.168*
(0.0840) (0.194) (0.148) (0.0836) (0.0748) (0.0962)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcant at *10%, **5%, and ***1% level. The sample size is 302 observations for the OLS
and quantile estimations. The quantile model speciﬁcation here in Table 4 follows the M5 model speciﬁcation of Table 3.
12 J.-J. SOON ET AL.
that a freshly minted graduate with a job at the lower salary distribution would be able to shift to a
job at higher quantiles if his or her CGPA score increases. The quantile estimates simply show that
that those graduates with jobs at lower quantiles of the salary distribution would see an increase
in their salaries with a unit increase in CGPA scores, but he or she is still ranked within that particular
salary quantile. In other words, the salary increase is just within the quantile, not an upgrade to a
higher quantile. This is also where the subtlety of a quantile estimate interpretation diﬀers from
that of interpreting a typical OLS estimate. In addition to the caveat mentioned, we are unable to
use more reﬁned versions of the quantile regression approach given the constraints of our
dataset, e.g. the instrumental variable quantile regression (Chernozhukov and Hansen 2008), and
the panel quantile regression (Koenker 2004).
Conclusion
This paper uses a 2016/2017 sample of 1107 freshly minted university graduates from a public and a
private university in Malaysia. The emphasis of the paper is on the marginal eﬀects of the variable of
interest – academic performance, proxied by CGPA – (i) on the probability of employment upon
graduation, (ii) on the salaries earned, and (iii) on diﬀerent quantiles of the salary distribution. This
paper contributes to the literature pool by examining the issues of graduate employment likelihood
upon graduation and their salaries in the Malaysian institutional setting. We ﬁll the literature gap by
providing an empirical analysis of how academic performance aﬀects new graduates in terms of
where they are on the salary distribution; such analyses are typically overlooked in the literature.
The key ﬁndings of this paper are as follows: (i) An increase in CGPA scores is not associated with
any statistically signiﬁcant changes in employment likelihood. However, the probability of being
employed for graduates with second-upper CGPA class is about 7–8 percentage points higher
than those who are not second-upper class holders. (ii) A 1.0-unit increase in CGPA scores is associ-
ated with a nontrivial 24.4% increase in salary, on average. For ﬁrst-class holders, they have a salary of
about 11.3% higher than their non-ﬁrst-class counterparts. (iii) The marginal eﬀects of the CGPA
scores suggest having higher CGPA scores would be most beneﬁcial if the graduates are working
in jobs at the lower half of the salary distribution. The eﬀect of having a ﬁrst-class degree decreases
as we move up the quantiles of the salary distribution.
Our empirical ﬁndings show no strong evidence of academic achievement being a key determi-
nant in whether or not a graduate secures a job upon graduation. Academic achievement aside,
employers are looking at other hiring criteria such as good articulation of ideas, real-world exposure,
good work ethics, and professional attitude. These criteria are inadequately captured by the existing
CGPA formulation, which is entirely based on academic performance such as examination scores. The
Malaysian Ministry of Education, however, is in the midst of ﬁne-tuning an improved version of the
CGPA, i.e. the iCGPA or integrated CGPA. The iCGPA is meant to be a more holistic way to evaluate
and assess the graduates, in terms of ethics, soft skills, entrepreneurial skills, leadership, and critical
thinking among others (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2015). In fact, as outlined in the Malaysian
Education Blueprint 2015–2025, it is one of Malaysia’s aspirations to produce holistic, entrepreneurial
and balanced graduates. The recent Gap Year programme for Malaysian university students intro-
duced in 2017 is another excellent way of producing more holistic graduates, i.e. by exposing
them to the world beyond the ivory tower; students can take a year oﬀ their studies to immerse
in volunteerism, travelling, or artistic pursuits. This way, it is hoped that they would graduate with
a well-rounded outlook of the real world in general. Our results here have yet another policy impli-
cation, i.e. pertaining to the National Higher Education Fund Corporation loan. Since its inception in
1997, it has become the most popular education loan for the majority of Malaysian students pursuing
their tertiary education at local public and private universities. Graduates with ﬁrst-class honours are
exempted from repaying the loan. This stipulated condition, to a certain extent, could inevitably steer
students towards striving only for academic excellence and to the detriments of neglecting non-aca-
demic achievement. Since our ﬁndings show no strong statistical signiﬁcance between academic
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achievement and employment, perhaps it is high time the Malaysian Ministry of Education tweaked
the exemption conditions to emphasise non-academic achievements. Our results could inform policy
debates on the over-emphasis of the academic achievement of the university curriculum.
Using quantile estimations on salary distribution as an extension to the typical OLS estimation on
salary, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of CGPA scores are not constant across the salary distribution. The
quantile estimations show that CGPA scores have larger eﬀects on the salary for graduates with
jobs at the lower ends of the salary distribution. This is understandable since such jobs would
most likely be typical entry-level jobs for new university graduates. Academic excellence in the
form of high CGPA scores could only help up to a certain level, since jobs at higher salary quantiles
would entail more than just academic excellence alone. More often than not, jobs at the upper eche-
lons of the salary distribution would require professional qualiﬁcation or special skill sets, for instance.
From this aspect, educational policies can be tailored towards the inclusion of related professional
qualiﬁcation into the curriculum of the undergraduate programmes. For example, graduates in the
Banking programme fromMalaysian universities would also receive their Executive Banker Certiﬁcate,
which is a professional qualiﬁcation awarded by the Asian Institute of Chartered Bankers. The pro-
fessional qualiﬁcation would pave the way for the graduates towards being full-ﬂedged chartered
bankers. This idea of pairing professional qualiﬁcations with university programmes could be
extended to other disciplines such as accounting, ﬁnance, sports science, and architecture, among
others. University graduates, geared with professional qualiﬁcations, would thus be better equipped
for jobs at higher quantiles of the salary distribution. Also, in line with the aspirations of the Malaysia
Education Blueprint, graduates should acquire entrepreneurial skills to be proactive job creators
rather than mere passive job seekers. Moreover, in today’s fast-changing labour market, graduates
could look into embracing the gig economy concept, thus moving away from conventional forms
of employment.
Our ﬁndings provide further insights and complement the Malaysian Tracer Study, a large-scale
comprehensive study conducted nationwide by the Ministry of Education on fresh university gradu-
ates (access to that dataset is strictly oﬀ-limit to the public). Policy-makers from the ministry could
scrutinise our ﬁndings for better informed decision-making in outlining future education policies.
Admittedly, one of the limitations of this study lies in the sample size; it would be ideal if the
sample could be expanded to include recent graduates from more public and private universities.
Another limitation is the cross-sectional nature of the dataset; a panel dataset following the graduates
over a period of time would be the gold standard. To compensate for the study’s limitations, we have
rigorously checked for empirical issues such as endogeneity bias and sample-selection bias.
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